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Abstract 
 
Is it the case that the law, in order to be fully legitimate, must not only be adopted in a 
procedurally correct way but must also comply with certain substantive values? In the first 
part of the paper I prepare the ground for the discussion of legitimacy of democratic laws by 
considering the relationship between law’s legitimacy, its justification and the obligation to 
obey the law. If legitimacy of law is seen as based on the law being justified (as in Raz’s 
“service conception”), our duty to obey it does not follow automatically: it must be based on 
some additional arguments. Raz’s conception of legitimate authority does not presuppose, as 
many critics claim, any unduly deferential attitude towards authorities. Disconnection of the 
law’s legitimacy from the absolute duty to obey it leads to the central part of the paper which 
consists in a critical scrutiny of the claim that the democratically adopted law is legitimate 
only insofar as it expresses the right moral values. This claim is shown to be, under one 
interpretation (“motivational”), nearly meaningless or, under another interpretation 
(“constitutional”), too strong to survive the pressure from moral pluralism. While we cannot 
hope for a design of “pure procedural democracy” (by analogy to Rawlsian “pure procedural 
justice”), democratic procedures express the values which animate the adoption of a 
democratic system in the first place. 
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It is often said that a democratic state, in order to be fully legitimate, must not only 
issue its laws in a procedurally correct way but must also ensure that they comply with certain 
substantive values. Democracy, it is said, not only requires designing and following the 
correct procedures but its laws must also comply with certain values, such as human dignity, 
liberty, equal concern for all, etc., in order to be fully legitimate. In this article I will subject 
this understanding – which, for the sake of brevity, I will call the ‘democracy-plus’ 
conception – to critical scrutiny. However, my main purpose will not be so much to refute 
this view, but rather to reflect on what such a call for the alignment of democracy with certain 
values really means – what plausible interpretations can be given to this demand? More 
specifically, my main concern will be with the links between ‘value-enhanced’ democracy 
(democracy that is not ‘merely’ procedural but rather claims to have been infused with the 
‘right’ values) and judgments concerning the legitimacy of democratically enacted laws. Just 
as the principle of the rule of law can be understood in a purely procedural or in a more 
substantive way (that is, either that government is subject to all laws, whatever they may be, 
or that it is only subject to those laws that can be viewed as ‘right’ or ‘just’), so the 
democratic rule can be understood in a similar manner. Can those laws that have procedurally 
democratic credentials but diverge from our views about the right ‘substantive’ values still be 
said to be legitimate? This is a somewhat stylized way of asking the question of central 
concern to me in this paper.  
As the above question immediately suggests, a great deal depends on how we understand the 
concept of law’s legitimacy. In trying to prepare the ground for the discussion of the 
legitimacy of  ‘democracy-plus’ that will occupy the second part of this paper, I will first 
attempt to elucidate the notion of law’s legitimacy by disentangling it from two other 
contiguous concepts: the justification of law and the obligation of citizens to obey it. I will 
take, as my starting point, a leading (and perhaps currently the most influential) theory in this 
area, namely Joseph Raz’s so-called “service conception” of legitimate authority. This choice 
is influenced not merely by the critical resonance that this theory has found in recent 
jurisprudential writings, but, more relevantly from our point of view, by the fact that it has 
frequently been charged with displaying insufficient respect for the importance of 
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procedurally democratic law-making as a significant factor in judging the legitimacy of laws, 
and also with underestimating the importance of promoting a critical, reflective attitude in 
citizens towards the law to which they are subject. The discussion of Raz’s conception of 
legitimacy therefore brings us directly into the heart of the relationship between democratic 
law-making and the legitimacy of law. Even if, as I will argue,  Raz’s conception may be 
unsatisfactory in some regards, this is not due to its alleged disregard for the importance of 
democracy nor the idea, which it allegedly promotes, that citizens should always defer to 
authority. The reason that such a suspicion may have arisen in the first place is related to the 
ambivalence of the very notion of “legitimacy”, and its location vis-à-vis the justification of 
the law on one hand and the citizens’ obligation to obey on the other. I will argue that if 
legitimacy is understood as relating to the question of a given law’s justification, then the 
objections of Raz’s critics are groundless; if, however, legitimacy is viewed as creating or 
supporting the citizens’ duty to obey (which is not the case in Raz’s work), then a different, 
separate argumentative step is required to show that it is legitimate, in addition to being 
justified.  Therefore, even if a justification-based understanding of legitimacy does not 
require that a law have certain procedural, democratic credentials (although, of course, the 
two are perfectly compatible), this is not necessarily the case when legitimacy is viewed as 
obligation-inducing: this, however, is not Raz’s concern, at least in terms of his “service 
conception” of legitimate authority. 
This clears the conceptual ground for a more substantive argument concerning the 
relationship between legitimacy and democracy, and, more specifically, for critical scrutiny 
of the demand that law, in order to be legitimate, must embody certain substantive values. 
Here, I will look in detail at the conventional warning against ‘democracy without values’, 
and suggest that the best way of understanding the “democracy-plus’ precept is to try to 
imagine what a democracy devoid of substantive values might look like, and what the 
advantages and disadvantages (if any) of such a system might be. To the extent that 
‘democracy without values’ is inconceivable (given that the very choice of a democratic 
design is inevitably and strongly value-based), the warning against ‘democracy without 
values’ is itself meaningless. However, I will argue that, beyond this foundational stage, the 
infusion of democracy with values may be seen as an important and meaningful demand, 
particularly if, as I will seek to demonstrate, a resort to the concept of ‘pure procedural 
democracy’, by analogy to Rawlsian ‘pure procedural justice’, is not readily available to us.  
We cannot be sure that, once the democratic procedure has been put in place, the values that 
inform its design will be replicated in the actual functioning of the system.  
In what way, then, can we plausibly understand the call for ‘democracy-plus’? I will suggest 
two possible understandings: one ‘motivational’, the other ‘constitutional’; and I will show 
that both exhibit a problematic, troublesome relationship to society’s moral pluralism. I will 
conclude by drawing together the two sections of this article, through an analysis of the 
findings of the second half in the light of the discussion of the notion of ‘legitimacy’ 
contained in the first. 
 
1. Justification, Legitimacy and the Obligation to Obey 
A. Legitimate Authority and the ‘Service Conception’ 
When is a state justified in issuing authoritative directives to its citizens? And if it is justified 
in doing so, does it follow eo ipso that its directives – its laws – are necessarily legitimate, 
leading to the creation of a duty to obey on our part? These three ideas: the justification of 
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law, its legitimacy, and the obligation of citizens to comply with it, are often conflated with 
each other in an unhelpful manner. In this first part of this article, I will attempt to disentangle 
them in an attempt to clear the conceptual field for the later discussion of the legitimacy of 
democratic authorities. 
A good starting point is Joseph Raz’s so-called ‘service conception of authority’, if only 
because it is currently so influential, both among its supporters and its detractors. The ‘service 
conception’ consists of three theses: the dependence thesis, the normal justification thesis and 
the pre-emption thesis. Here, I will only outline each of these in a simplified manner. 
According to the first thesis, authoritative directives should only be adopted for reasons 
which apply to their intended subjects (and not, for example, for reasons relevant to the 
authorities themselves).  The second holds that desired outcomes will most often be achieved 
if the subjects allow themselves to be guided by the directives of the authority rather than 
acting on those reasons directly.  The third states that the authoritative directives supersede, 
rather than complement, the reasons for their own adoption (which I will here refer to as 
‘original reasons’, as opposed to the directives which constitute new reasons for action by the 
subjects). 
This conception is, at first blush, vulnerable to the objection that it cannot be squared with the 
idea that citizens should have a critical, reflective attitude towards the authorities that govern 
them; a critical attitude characteristic of a democratic society in which it should be generally 
accepted that, as H.L.A. Hart had famously put it, ‘however great the aura of majesty or 
authority which the official system may have, its demands must in the end be submitted to a 
moral scrutiny’.1 Even though Raz had anticipated objections along these lines and protested 
in advance that ‘No blind obedience to authority is here implied’,2 nevertheless the charge has 
been laid. Ronald Dworkin, for one, has observed rather caustically that ‘[t]his account of the 
nature and point of authority insists on a certain attitude toward authority’,3 namely, ‘a degree 
of deference toward legal authority that almost no one shows in modern democracies’.4 It is 
worth looking more closely at Dworkin’s explanation:  
We do not treat even those laws we regard as perfectly valid and legitimate as 
excluding and replacing the background reasons the framers of that law rightly 
considered in adopting it. We rather regard those laws as creating rights and duties 
that normally trump those other reasons. The reasons remain, and we sometimes 
need to consult them to decide whether, in particular circumstances, they are so 
extraordinarily powerful or important that the law’s trump should not prevail.5  
Dworkin then goes on to elaborate this point by giving the example of President Abraham 
Lincoln who, during the Civil War, suspended the writ of habeas corpus even though the US 
Constitution denies such a power to the President acting on his own, instead assigning it to 
Congress. Dworkin’s criticism, however, misses the point, and his Lincoln example actually 
seems to confirm rather than undermine Raz’s conception. Raz is not suggesting, in his 
service conception of authority, that citizens are advised to follow the authority’s directives 
                                                          
1
 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961) at 206. 
2
 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (1994) at 215 
3
 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Thirty Years On (Book Review of The Practice of Principle by Jules Coleman)’, 115 
Harvard Law Review 1655 at 1671 (2002). 
4
 Ibid at 1672. 
5
 Ibid at 1672. 
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rather than their own reasons for action; rather, he is saying that if they do so, then the 
authority is, for them, legitimate. This is a conceptual analysis of the notion of legitimate 
authority rather than a normative thesis about the subjection of citizens to the authorities. The 
language that Dworkin uses to describe the status of the original reasons after the law has 
entered into the scene actually confirms this: rights and duties created by the law ‘trump’ the 
original reasons – which is exactly what Raz describes by using the language of ‘pre-
emption’.  
‘The reasons remain…’, Dworkin observes, but this does not mark any difference between 
the (Razian) pre-emption thesis and his own account, because the reasons ‘remain’ only in the 
sense that they inform us whether, under the circumstances, we should comply with the law’s 
directives, or consider some extra-legal, even illegal, course of action. This residual role of 
the original reasons after law has entered the stage is perfectly compatible with – indeed, 
supports – Raz’s pre-emption thesis, because the limits to the pre-emption are at the same 
time the limits of law’s legitimacy. If the law’s ‘subjects do not guide their actions by its 
instructions instead of by the reasons on which they are supposed to depend’6 then the law, at 
this point, is no longer a legitimate authority for them because it does not fulfil the role of 
mediating between people and the practical reasons upon which they act – a ‘mediation’ 
central to Raz’s account.7  
Dworkin’s example of Lincoln and of his suspension of habeas corpus seems to confirm this: 
‘Most of us treat the Constitution as both legitimate and authoritative. But many 
commentators nevertheless think both that Abraham Lincoln was morally right to suspend 
habeas corpus during the Civil War and that he acted illegally’.8 Expressed in Raz’s terms, 
what Lincoln did was to revert to the original reasons for action rather than to act on the 
Constitution’s authority: the perceived emergency inclined him into an illegal but politically 
and morally preferable solution. Far from questioning Raz’s pre-emption thesis, Dworkin 
actually confirms Raz’s account in his own parlance: legal rights normally ‘trump’ our 
various extra-legal considerations (e.g. of utility), but extra-legal considerations may ‘trump’ 
the law’s authority when compliance with law’s directives is morally or politically 
indefensible. This becomes even clearer when Dworkin adds:  
Lincoln did not deny the Constitution’s authority in making his decision; he simply weighed 
that authority against competing reasons of the kind the Framers had also taken into account 
which retained their vitality. Lincoln found that the latter were, under the circumstances, 
strong enough to outweigh the former.9  
It is somewhat puzzling that Dworkin sees this account of Lincoln’s unconstitutional but 
morally and politically justified action as contrary to Raz’s account of what constitutes 
legitimate authority. The point of Dworkin’s account is as follows: the Framers of the 
Constitution had contemplated various reasons that the President and/or Congress might have 
had for suspending the writ and in the end had decided that the reasons for the President to act 
alone were not compelling enough to grant him this constitutional power. Those reasons 
(ultimately discarded by the Framers) ‘retained their vitality’ nevertheless (though in an 
extra-legal realm, so to speak), and Lincoln acted on them, in contrast to what the 
                                                          
6
 Raz, above n 2 at 215. 
7
 Ibid at 214: ‘[The dependence and the normal justification theses] regard authorities as mediating between 
people and the right reasons which apply to them, so that the authority judges and pronounces what they ought 
to do according to right reason’ [emphasis in original]. 
8
 Dworkin, above n 3 at 1672. 
9
 Ibid at 1672. 
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Constitution provided; hence, he acted illegally, but, in the eyes of Dworkin and ‘many 
commentators’ with whom he aligns himself, morally correctly. This is perfectly compatible 
with Raz’s account: in Raz’s terminology, on this particular issue, Lincoln decided that it was 
better to revert to his own original reasons for action (which, we may infer, were related to do 
with the most efficient way of avoiding great national disaster in a situation of emergency, 
and which mandated his unilateral action to suspend the writ) rather than use the authoritative 
directives contained in the Constitution as the best way of giving effect to those original 
reasons. So in this particular case, he denied the legitimacy of the Constitution, which is just 
another way of saying, as Dworkin himself admits, that Lincoln acted ‘illegally’ and at the 
same time in a ‘morally right’ fashion. 
There is one way in which the above defence of Raz’s conception may be challenged, and its 
consistency with Dworkin’s account of the Lincoln example questioned. It may be argued 
that the property of legitimacy applies to the authority across the board, and not to its specific 
directives, so that a subject may disregard one or another specific directive of an authority (or, 
in Raz’s terminology, act on her own reasons for action rather than allow the authoritative 
directives to pre-empt them) and still recognize the legitimacy of the authority as a whole. 
Such an interpretation seems to be offered by Dworkin when he states that, in his example, 
‘Lincoln did not deny the Constitution’s authority in making his decision’, and yet that ‘he 
acted illegally’. This, however, seems to be a pedantic gambit. The fact that Lincoln ‘acted 
illegally’ on this particular issue means that, on this particular issue, he denied the legitimacy 
of the Constitution as applying to him. The recognition of legitimacy may be a matter of 
degree: Raz actually mentions that a legal system’s legitimate authority ‘may not be as 
extensive as it claims’.10 We may, of course, adopt by definitional fiat a convention whereby 
legitimacy applies only to the authority as a whole rather than to its particular directives, but 
then we would need another idiom to describe the situation in which a subject recognizes the 
general authority of a given entity, but refuses to recognize a specific directive as properly 
incorporating the right reasons relevant to himself. Nothing is lost by saying that such a 
specific directive held to be ‘illegitimate’ by this subject, and nothing is gained by assigning 
the notion of legitimacy only to authority in general, and denying it to specific authoritative 
directives. 
B. Authority and Identification of Valid Law 
Raz’s pre-emption thesis seems therefore to be a useful enough account of what it means for 
subjects to treat an authority as legitimate. What is more problematic, however, is the account 
of the law as necessarily and always identifiable without regard to the original reasons that 
the law-makers have amalgamated, so to speak, into the legal directives. It is one thing for 
Raz to insist on the conceptual truth about ‘legitimate’ authorities pre-empting the citizens’ 
appeal to non-legal reasons insofar as they recognize the legitimacy of a given directive; it is 
another thing altogether to claim that the law must be fully identifiable by its subjects without 
ascertainment of the original reasons for action that it is now meant to displace. The latter 
claim is not a necessary condition of the intelligibility of the former.   
We can say that, insofar as we recognize the law’s legitimacy, we disregard the competing, 
non-legal reasons for action (in the sense that if those non-legal considerations outweigh the 
legal directives, then this is just another way of saying that the law’s legitimacy has reached 
its limits), and also that in order to ascertain the correct meaning of the legal directives, we 
must appeal, at times, to the very reasons that the law seeks to translate into the language of 
                                                          
10
 Raz, above n 2 at 215. 
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legal rules. The latter statement may upset the architectural elegance of Raz’s construction in 
the sense that the dependent, or original, reasons for action may appear twice in the process of 
the compliance with law: firstly, at the stage of the translation of dependent reasons into legal 
rules by legal authorities; and secondly, at the stage of ascertaining the meaning of those legal 
rules by those to whom they are addressed. This, however, is not as problematic as it may at 
first seem: it is not contradictory to claim, at the same time, that (1) to treat the law as a 
legitimate authority means to surrender the appeal to the original (non-legal) reasons in 
deciding about one’s action, on the basis that the law effectively translates those reasons into 
its directives, and that (2) in order to identify the meaning of the legal directives we need, at 
times, to refer back to those original (non-legal) reasons.  Acceptance of these two 
propositions, untidy though it may seem, has the advantage of saving the concept of law from 
patently counter-intuitive conclusions, according to which a number of legal standards would 
have to be simply denied the quality of law precisely because in order to ascertain their 
meaning, the subjects need to resort to the reasons that triggered the elevation of these 
standards to legal status in the first place.   
This, indeed, is the meaning of ‘standards’ in those contexts when, in legal theory, they are 
contrasted to ‘rules’ (not to be confused with Dworkin’s rules/principles distinction).11 When 
the law denies enforceability to those contracts that ‘unreasonably’ restrain trade, or prohibits 
‘establishment’ of a religion, etc., then it calls upon its subjects to replicate in their minds the 
reasons for action that it now purports to ‘pre-empt’. In order to fix the meaning of those 
standards (and therefore, of the authoritative directives of law) its subjects must go back to 
the original reasons for enacting them in the first place. To be sure, it is not merely a simple 
replication of the process of translation of the original reasons into directives, because the 
very fact of already having those (and other) legal directives in force introduces some 
important constraints upon the meanings that can be given to them (and this is the point of 
Dworkin’s theory of constructive interpretation in law).12 A subject or an enforcer of a legal 
standard do not have the same freedom of interpretation as the legislators and voters had 
when they argued for the introduction of the rule in the first place. If a legal standard 
prohibits, for example, the establishment of a religion, then there are limits as to which 
actions, under the interpretative conventions of a given legal order, may be viewed as the 
unconstitutional establishment of religion. However, within those constraints, in order to 
ascertain exactly what is and is not prohibited (for instance, whether state financial aid to 
religious schools counts as ‘establishment’ or not), a subject and an enforcer of this legal 
directive will have to enquire into the underlying purposes, principles and/or policies that it is 
supposed to implement. They know that the law mediates between the background policies 
and principles and specific authoritative decisions, and at times to identify the meaning of the 
mediating directives we need to look back to the original reasons that inspired them.   
Indeed, law-makers may justifiably intend, in some circumstances, to force us to do just this, 
for instance in order to introduce some necessary flexibility into the law at the stage of its 
application (because flexibility at the point of law-making may often be politically 
unfeasible); to avoid incidences of substantive injustice caused by the scrupulous application 
of a by-and-large justified rule; to reduce the levels of over- and under-inclusiveness that 
                                                          
11
 See, in particular, Duncan Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’, 89 Harvard Law 
Review 1685 (1976); Kathleen Sullivan, ‘The Supreme Court, 1991 Term – Foreword: The Justices of Rules and 
Standards’, 106 Harvard Law Review 22 (1992); Jeremy Waldron, ‘Legal and Political Philosophy’, in Jules 
Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds, The Oxford Handbook on Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (2002), 352-81 
at 354-6. 
12
 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) at 62-68. 
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necessarily occur when the background policies and principles are ‘translated’ into rough-
and-ready rules, or for a whole host of other reasons.13 We (i.e., the subjects and enforcers of 
those directives) will then need to engage in the ascertainment of the meaning of those 
background principles and policies, and also in a rather complex balancing of the values at 
stake, thus largely replicating the moral balancing (though within the constraints of valid 
interpretative conventions) that initially led to the adoption of the directive. We may express 
this proposition in the language of Dworkin’s ‘constructive interpretation’, or in the language 
of theorists of so-called ‘inclusive positivism’ who claim that law, at times, incorporates 
moral standards into the meaning of its authoritative rules. Either way, Raz’s view that 
essential to the very notion of authority is the idea that the meaning of authoritative directives 
should be identifiable without recourse to the original reasons that the directives supposedly 
pre-empt cannot be squared with the pervasive presence of ‘standards’ (as opposed to ‘rules’) 
in legal directives. Nor can it be squared with the fact that the distinction between standards 
and rules is a more a matter of degree than of a sharp divide: many directives, which at first 
blush look like straight rules, may be ‘corrupted by exceptions’14 to the point at which they 
more closely resemble standards. 
C. Legitimate Authority and Democracy 
While Raz’s normal justification thesis is unhelpful in describing how such legal standards 
actually operate, its conception of legitimate authority is defensible if one remembers that it is 
not a normative thesis about how legitimacy should be generated, but rather a conceptual 
analysis of what it means for authority to be legitimate. The source of misunderstanding 
about Raz’s conception may be that Raz himself is not quite clear about this distinction 
between the possible aspirations of his project. Recently, one of his critics, Scott Hershovitz, 
claimed that the ‘normal justification thesis’ neglects the importance of the procedural 
mechanisms of democracy:  
If a government’s electoral system favors some interests in society, or appears 
corruptly financed, or causes portions of the population to be marginalized and 
voiceless, we are quick to judge it illegitimate, or at least less legitimate than it 
might be otherwise. Where these deficiencies are present, it counts for little that a 
government may produce substantively good decisions, decisions that the normal 
justification thesis [of Raz] would hold authoritative. … This shows us one way in 
which the normal justification thesis is incomplete as a theory of legitimacy for 
political authorities: Governments that fulfill it may fail to be legitimate on 
procedural grounds.15  
The source of the confusion is that, in offering his conception, Raz is less interested in the 
problem of legitimacy than in that of authority: his avowed aim is to tell us what it means for 
one person or entity to have authority over another. But to construct the concept of authority, 
Raz chooses to take as a point of departure the notion of legitimate authority. It is only once 
we learn what legitimate authority means (that is, that it applies only the dependent reasons, 
and so on) that we can discover what a less-than-legitimate authority is: by identifying what 
features it lacks in comparison with a legitimate one. And so we learn from Raz that ‘the law 
either claims that it possesses legitimate authority, or is held to possess it or both’, and that 
                                                          
13
 Including to promote civic deliberation in the process of adjudication, see Sullivan, above n 11 at 67-69. 
14
 Ibid at 61. 
15
 Scott Hershovitz, ‘Legitimacy, Democracy, and Razian Authority’, 9 Legal Theory 201 at 216 (2003). 
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even if the law fails to posses legitimate authority, it is a conceptual truth that it must at least 
‘claim’ to do so.16 (As Dworkin has observed, this is in many respects a bizarre proposition, 
but we may leave this matter to one side here).17 So it is not the case that, according to Raz, 
we first develop a concept of authority and then add to it the conditions of its legitimacy; 
rather, the converse seems to be the case, as the very concept of authority is not intelligible 
without a prior notion of legitimate authority. (It is rather as if we defined ‘postage stamps’ 
by defining ‘valid postage stamps’ first, and only then explained that there are also stamps 
which lack some conditions of validity – but the very idea of a ‘postage stamp’ is 
unintelligible without knowing first what a valid stamp means). This is confirmed when Raz 
says that ‘[a]uthority in general can be divided into legitimate and de facto authority. The 
latter either claims to be legitimate or is believed to be so….’18; either way, any authority, 
whether legitimate or not, derives conceptually from the property of legitimacy.   
Legitimacy, or the lack thereof, is in the eyes of the critical observer: a de facto authority 
either commands ‘legitimacy’ by virtue of the beliefs of its subjects, or at the very least 
claims to be legitimate, even if it fails to engender this belief among its subjects. Under Raz’s 
definitional proposal, an ‘authority’ that neither claims legitimacy nor is believed to be 
legitimate is a contradiction in terms. This seems acceptable: indeed, we have a different 
vocabulary for a political power that does not even try to create pretensions of legitimacy: 
tyranny, occupation force, etc. The use of the language of ‘authority’ carries a modicum of an 
honorific acknowledgement of a (real or at least claimed) connection between the exercise of 
the authority and certain facts about the subjects of the authority (namely, the reasons for 
action that they have independently of the existence of the authority itself). ‘An authority’ 
that did not even pretend to respect such a connection, and yet were successful in controlling 
the behaviour of its subjects, would not be even an ‘illegitimate’ authority; it would not be an 
‘authority’ at all, representing nothing but naked power. Whether the ‘authority’ is legitimate 
or not is a matter of its degree of success (in the eyes of a critical observer) in establishing a 
close connection between its directives and the background reasons that would otherwise 
guide the actions of the laws addressees – in Raz’s terminology, ‘reasons which apply to the 
subjects of those directives.’  
Viewed in this way, Raz is immune to the criticism that he neglects the importance of 
procedural devices of democracy. His project is to suggest a concept of authority that 
necessarily relies upon a prior concept of legitimacy, rather than to propose a normative 
political theory about what are the necessary and sufficient conditions of legitimacy. But the 
concept of authority he outlines lends itself well to the democratic interpretation suggested by 
Hershovitz: it is only a matter of interpreting the meaning of ‘the reasons which apply to the 
subjects’ of authoritative directives. We may recall that Raz claimed in his ‘dependence 
thesis’ that the very concept of (legitimate) authority requires that directives be based ‘on 
reasons which apply to the subjects of those directives’; the whole point of the ‘service 
conception’ is to place the (legitimate) authorities in the position of mediating between the 
subjects and ‘the right reasons which apply to them’.19 But what reasons can ‘apply to the 
subjects’ other than those that they actually have? To be sure, one can suggest that 
paternalistic non-democratic authorities (perhaps in the idealized version offered by Rawls 
                                                          
16
 Raz, above n 2 at  215 
17
 Dworkin, above n 3 at 1666-67. 
18
 Raz, above n 2 at 211. 
19
 Ibid at 214. 
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when he described decent and well-ordered, though illiberal, societies)20 can better identify 
the reasons that ‘apply to the subjects’ than can the subjects themselves. This, however, is a 
matter of normative political philosophy; manifestly not what Raz engages in when 
describing his ‘service conception’. So it is perfectly compatible with Raz’s theory to claim 
that the only way for the authorities to ascertain ‘the reasons that apply to the subjects’ of 
authoritative directives is by asking those subjects themselves, through democratic elections, 
representative bodies, referenda, etc. Combining such a (very plausible) normative political 
philosophy with Raz’s ‘service conception’ brings about precisely what Hershovitz claims 
(although he presents his claim as a criticism of Raz’s thesis), namely, that the only authority 
that can be legitimate under the service conception is one that is procedurally democratic. 
  
The fact that Raz’s conception can be reconciled also with a non-democratic, paternalistic 
theory (according to which the authorities are legitimate if they properly discern the reasons 
relevant to their subjects without asking the subjects themselves what they take those reasons 
to be) is not an argument against the service conception, because Raz might simply retort that, 
as a matter of normative political philosophy, he considers the paternalistic conception deeply 
implausible. Therefore, while Raz’s understanding of legitimate authority is broad enough to 
accommodate various democratic and non-democratic political theories alike, the use of this 
concept does not reveal indifference towards democratic procedures. This is quite simply a 
separate debate (about how to go about identifying the reasons relevant to the subjects of 
authority), and Raz is free to claim that it has only one plausible outcome. 
D. Justification and Obligation 
At the start of this section, I stated that I would deal here with justification, legitimacy and the 
obligation to obey the law, but thus far I have focused exclusively on legitimacy; it is now 
time to consider the other two categories. Let us begin with the relationship between the 
legitimacy of law and the obligation to obey it. There is an understandable temptation, at a 
commonsense level, to draw a tight conceptual connection between the two: while there is no 
reason to obey a law which is illegitimate or the legitimacy of which is in doubt, what is the 
point (the argument may go) of ascertaining the legitimacy of a given law other than to 
identify our obligation to obey it? As in Shakespeare’s ‘Henry IV’, when Glendower boasts, 
‘I can call spirits from the vasty deep’, and Hotspur retorts: ‘Why, so can I, or so can any 
man;/But will they come when you call for them?’,21 a finding that a law is legitimate may 
appear redundant unless it is necessarily connected to the validation of the duty to obey it. 
Indeed, it may be even argued that we may have at times an obligation to obey laws that are 
perhaps less-than-legitimate, and so have an unquestionable obligation to obey the legitimate 
law. Consider John Finnis’s dictum that ‘if an unjust [legal] stipulation is, in fact, 
homogeneous with other laws in its formal source, in its reception by courts and officials, and 
in its common acceptance, the good citizen may (not always) be morally required to conform 
to that stipulation to the extent necessary to avoid weakening ‘the law’, the legal system (of 
rules, institutions, and dispositions as a whole’. 22  This is because, in the case of a 
disobedience of a particular unjust law that is an aberration in an otherwise reasonably just 
system, we should be concerned about not undermining the effectiveness of the legal system 
                                                          
20
 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), especially at 59-88. 
21
 William Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act 3 Scene 1 
22
 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980) at 361-2. 
Wojciech Sadurski 
10 
as a whole in pursuing the common good. Hence it may seem that in the case of a law that we 
consider to be legitimate (by our own criteria, whatever they may be) our moral obligation to 
comply must be all the stronger.  
The connection, however, is not as close as it would seem at first sight, and it is significant 
that for a number of legal theorists the obligatory nature of laws does not necessarily follow 
from their legitimacy. Kent Greenawalt, for example, identifies a number of different 
correlates of the idea of a legitimate political authority, and the proposition that the governed 
should obey the directives of those with authority is only one among a number of others 
possible, such as that those with political authority are justified in issuing certain kinds of 
directives to those they govern, or that they are justified in using force to induce compliance, 
or that the governed should not interfere with such uses of force, etc.23 Similarly, Robert 
Ladenson has suggested that ‘The right to rule is … a justification right … [which] by itself 
implies nothing about either the subject’s duty of allegiance to the state or of compliance with 
the law’.24 Indeed, the view that the notion of legitimate authority merely connotes that the 
authority is justified in issuing directives to the subjects, but not that the subjects have a 
corresponding duty to comply with these directives, seems to be quite widespread in current 
legal theory.  
To see clearly why this disconnection of legitimacy and obligation to comply is eminently 
persuasive, it suffices to consider again Raz’s understanding of legitimate authority (the 
‘service conception’). According to this conception, as we have seen, those subject to the 
authority are more likely to comply with directives founded upon reasons relevant to them. 
This means that these original reasons that people espouse identify important aspects of their 
well-being, broadly understood, and that the they are more likely to attain this well-being if 
they comply with the authoritative directives rather than attempting to achieve it unilaterally 
(or, in Raz’s terminology, through acting on those reasons directly). The only implication of 
this conception is that it is rational, or wise, or prudent, for the subjects of an authority to 
follow authoritative directives (which already, under a legitimate authority, correctly 
incorporate the original reasons) rather than try to find their own way of attaining those 
aspects of their well-being. This can be accepted; no-one, however, has a duty to be rational, 
or wise, or prudent.25 To establish such a duty requires some additional normative argument. 
If I choose to ignore the directives issued by legitimate authorities (directives that, by 
definition, better reflect the reasons which apply  to me than any unilateral action I could 
take), I may make my life more difficult, and fail to attain most efficiently the goals identified 
by my original reasons – but I have not breached any obligation on my part. I would have 
breached an obligation if, for instance, by disregarding the authoritative directives and acting 
on my own reasons directly, I failed to discharge duties of fairness to my fellow-citizens (who 
do follow the authoritative directives in a way that pre-empts their own, original reasons for 
action), or if I undermined the law’s effort to provide the best coordination of individual 
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 R. Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality (1987) at 50-51. 
24
 Robert Ladenson, ‘In Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law’ in J. Raz (ed.), Authority (1990) at 36-37. 
25
 This is consistent with what Raz had claimed well before he has formulated his ‘service conception of 
authority’, namely that there is no general moral obligation to obey the law; more specifically, he showed that 
such an obligation does not follow from our undeniable duty to support and uphold good institutions (and so, in 
the later language, the institutions that properly translate our original reasons into authoritative directives). The 
duty to support good institutions, Raz says, gives birth to an obligation to obey only those laws that guarantee 
the functioning of a democratic government, while ‘It provides reasons to obey other laws only to the extent that 
by doing so one sets a good example or that by failing so to act one sets a bad example: that is, only to the extent 
that obedience to these other laws strengthens or prevents weakening the laws on which the democratic character 
of the government is founded’, Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (1979) at 241. 
Law’s Legitimacy and ‘Democracy-Plus’ 
 
11 
actions in pursuit of public goods, or if I reneged on an implied promise to obey the law, 
which others might have legitimately read into my conduct and relied on in their actions, and 
so on.  However, each of these grounds for alleging a breach of obligation requires an 
additional theory about the bases of my obligation: that, for example, the law parallels the 
schemes of cooperation that generate reciprocal duties of fairness; or that law is generally 
efficient in coordinating individual actions to deflect collective-action problems and that 
when it is certified as such, we all have a duty to contribute to such an efficient outcome; or 
that our continued presence in the society can be viewed as analogous to an implicit promise 
to be bound by a legitimate law, etc. Each of these theories may or may not be persuasive – 
and, as we know, entire libraries can be filled with literature arising from the disputes and 
disagreements over these, and other, proposed grounds for a political obligation. One thing, 
however, is clear: these are additional theories that are necessary to provide a moral basis for 
a duty to comply with a legitimate law, and that a concept of legitimate authority, such as that 
proposed by Raz, evidently does not ground, per se, such a duty.   
However, the matter is more complicated than that, and Raz’s is not the only theory of 
legitimate authority around. It is worth looking at those theorists who, in contrast to 
Greenawalt,26 Ladenson and others, draw a strict connection between legitimacy and the duty 
to obey. Perhaps the most interesting version of such a conception was recently proposed by 
A. John Simmons who describes (what he calls) a ‘Lockean account’ (which is also his, 
Simmons’, preferred one) of state legitimacy in the following way: 
A state’s (or government’s) legitimacy is the complex moral right it possesses to be 
the exclusive imposer of binding duties on its subjects, to have its subjects comply 
with these duties, and to use coercion to enforce the duties. Accordingly, state 
legitimacy is the logical correlate of various obligations, including subjects’ 
political obligations. A state’s ‘legitimacy right’ is in part a right held specifically 
against the subjects bound by any state-imposed duties, arising from morally 
significant relations – in Locke’s case, consensual relations – between state and 
subject.27  
Simmons goes on to elaborate on the last point in this quotation, namely on the nature of the 
‘special moral relationship with any particular subject’ 28  that gives the state a moral 
legitimacy, which in turn creates a duty to comply on the part of the subjects. His discussion, 
inspired by Locke, is complex and I do not propose to summarize it here, but the main point 
(for our purposes) is this:  For Locke, as for Simmons, the moral justification of a state is one 
thing, the validation of its legitimacy quite another. Moral justification is a matter of 
identifying, and applauding, the general quality of a state, such as its unique ability to solve 
various coordination problems, to institutionalize and enforce rights, to suppress violence, etc. 
To justify states we need to show that they are beneficial, and of course not all states are 
beneficial; hence, not all states are justified. If a state is justified, it may, at best, ground our 
duty not to undermine it and perhaps even to positively support it – but not necessarily to 
obey it. Obedience is another matter: it requires some special relationship between the state 
and a particular subject, because ‘[t]he fact that a state or a business has virtues that can be 
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appealed to in order to justify its existence cannot by itself argue for its having special rights 
over particular individuals’.29 Those ‘special rights’ constitute the state’s legitimacy – and 
they have to be defended on some other grounds (which Simmons characterizes as ‘morally 
significant relationship’ between the state and a particular individual) than merely the net 
benefits of having a state (or that state) that justify its existence. 
Thus far I have been dealing with legitimacy without making any distinction between the 
legitimacy of particular rules and the legitimacy of a system of legal rules as a whole. Indeed, 
as I suggested earlier, legitimacy may be a matter of degree, and the legitimacy of a system 
may be seen as emerging from the recognition of the legitimacy of a great many specific legal 
directives that it contains. From the citizens’ point of view, however, which is that of the 
legal obligation to obey, disobedience can normally be expressed only with regard to specific 
legal rules, not to the system as a whole. In such circumstances, as John  Finnis noted, ‘your 
allegiance to the whole system (‘the law’) is put on the line: either you obey the particular 
law, or you reveal yourself … as lacking or defective in allegiance to the whole, as well as to 
the particular’.30 It would appear, therefore, that there is an important asymmetry between the 
problems of the legitimacy and the obligatory nature of the law: the former crystallizes only 
at the level of particular law, while the latter does so at both the particular and systemic level.  
This distinction between the particular and the systemic needs not concern us here, however, 
as the asymmetry just noted does not affect the relationship between legitimacy and 
obligation in a way damaging to the argument here. After all, if legitimacy is based, as in 
Simmons’ work, on special grounds that link the state with the individuals, then these 
grounds may equally concern specific laws or the system as a whole. And if legitimacy is 
based upon ‘dependent reasons’ being correctly encapsulated in legal directives, as in Raz’s 
understanding, then legitimacy is even more readily identifiable at the level of particular rules.  
Similarly, repeated disobedience to a great number of particular laws amounts to a general 
habit of disobedience, which may (or may not) be based on a citizen’s refusal to grant 
legitimacy to the legal system as a whole. However, there is no reason that we cannot say that 
someone may accord general legitimacy to the system as a whole, while at the same time 
refusing to obey a particular law on the basis that she finds it illegitimate.31  
Simmons’ conception nicely demonstrates a general proposition that I want to make at this 
point, in bringing together the three concepts that I referred to at the start of this section: 
justification, legitimacy and the obligation to obey. The general thesis is this: either 
justification and legitimacy are taken to be substantively the same thing (or, to be more 
precise, rely on substantively the same arguments) and then the obligation to obey requires 
separate moral arguments than those used to support the other two (as in Raz, Greenawalt and 
Ladenson), or justification and legitimacy are two different things (each requiring different 
sorts of moral arguments) but then the obligation to obey follows necessarily from the 
validation of a state as legitimate (as in Simmons). To simplify, within the trichotomy of 
justification – legitimacy – obligation to obey, the notion of legitimacy is strategically central: 
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either we align it with justification (and have a reasonably weak notion of legitimacy, 
equivalent to the state being justified in issuing directives) or with an obligation to obey (and 
then we have a strong concept of legitimacy, equivalent to the duty of compliance). What you 
cannot have is the alignment of all three concepts with each other, as we then lose sight of the 
crucial fact that we do not have a duty to obey a state merely on the basis that it is doing what 
it’s supposed to do. Whether we conceptualize the fact that the state is performing well its 
proper functions in the language of Raz’s service conception of legitimate authority (and say 
that the state is correctly incorporating the dependent reasons into its authoritative directives, 
thus giving its subjects rational reasons to suppress their own independent reasons for action 
and to act on the state directives directly), or in the language of Simmons’ moral justification 
of a state, is ultimately unimportant, and may be seen as a matter of definitional fiat. What is 
important is the awareness that in the chain of reasoning: ‘justification – legitimacy – duty to 
obey’ we always have two separate argumentative steps, not just one; and that we should 
avoid the non-sequitur of moving directly from a moral justification of a state to the political 
obligations of citizens. 
2. ‘Democracy-Plus’ 
A. ‘Democracy Without Values’ 
A few years ago, speaking before the Polish Parliament (‘Sejm’) Pope John Paul II urged his 
audience – the parliamentarians of a newly democratized State – not to ignore the importance 
of the right moral values: ‘Whilst the autonomy proper to the life of a political community 
must be respected, it should also be borne in mind that a political community cannot be seen 
as independent of ethical principles’.32 He then went on to quote his own Encyclical, Veritatis 
Splendor, of 1993: ‘As history demonstrates, a democracy without values easily turns into 
open or thinly disguised totalitarianism’.33  As we can see, the present Pontiff phrased the 
questions of the conditions of democratic legitimacy in a remarkably similar way to that in 
which I framed the issue at the start of this article: namely, that democracy must be enhanced 
with values – ‘democracy-plus’, in my proposed vocabulary – in order to provide a strong 
basis for the legitimacy of democratically established legal directives.  
‘A political [democratic] community cannot be seen as independent of ethical principles’; ‘a 
democracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism’. What is 
the meaning of these warnings? The only way we can make sense of them is, I believe, by 
imagining what the negatives would be like: what a democratic community ‘independent of 
ethical principles’ or a ‘democracy without values’ might look like. Just as we can sometimes 
articulate intelligibly the shape of a positive precept (say, ‘wealth with wisdom’) only by 
realizing the shape, and the consequences, of its negative counterpart (‘wealth without 
wisdom’), so we can give a proper meaning to the call for infusing democracy with values 
only by thinking about what ‘democracy without values’ would be like, and what would be 
wrong with it.  
However, such a thought experiment is less easy than it may at first appear. For one thing, 
democracy as a system is based on particular, strong (and, by implication, controversial) 
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moral values. The very choice of a democratic system, and a commitment to the maintenance 
and defence of democracy against the alternative institutional systems, is not in itself value-
neutral. Perhaps the most obvious moral value that is necessarily presupposed by a 
democratic system is that of equal moral agency of every human being in terms of 
influencing decisions about public arrangements. What other reasons would we have to adopt 
a majority-rule based institutional design (which is, subject to all possible caveats and 
reservations, the irreducible hard core of any democracy)34 if we had not adopted, as an 
overarching political value, some precept about the equal moral agency (or dignity) of all? 
After all, under many plausible and empirically testable conceptions, the conferral of a (more-
or-less) equal vote upon every adult citizen, on matters of common concern, is deeply 
irrational and arbitrary. People vary widely in terms of their intelligence, knowledge, 
experience, moral integrity, honesty, contributions to public welfare, courage, and so on. 
Each of these properties (and many others) could be shown to be relevant to the exercise of a 
right to affect public decisions; hence, each could constitute a ground of reducing or 
enhancing one’s ‘vote’ on public issues, for instance, in parliamentary elections. If, intuitively, 
we found such a proposed radical departures from a ‘one person – one vote’ principle 
objectionable (as, I take it, we usually do) then it must be because there are some powerful 
moral values that would be offended by such a departure. Of course, we may be hesitant to 
embark upon such a path also for non-moral reasons: we might think, for instance, that it will 
be increasingly costly to test and assign the vote based on any of such proposed criteria; or 
that it might increase the potential for corruption and moral hazard; or we may reject it 
because any agreement to such a proposed re-assignment of votes would itself have to be 
subject to a justifiable re-weighing of votes, which runs us into an infinite regress, etc. But 
while each of these objections is serious, taken together they would not be weighty enough if 
we thought that the principle of one person–one vote was fundamentally morally flawed; 
furthermore, we would be much more determined than we currently are about finding a more 
morally justified system, and only then start worrying about the practical difficulties of 
putting the alternative into practice.  
So it is like ascertaining the existence of a planet not by observing it directly but rather by 
drawing inferences from the puzzling behaviour of other, visible planets: the fact that we 
intuitively reject, on moral grounds, suggestions for apportioning the vote on the grounds of, 
for example, intelligence implies the assumption of a powerful value (or set of values) that 
trump these, otherwise prima facie plausible, grounds for differential assignment of the right 
to vote. What might this other, powerful value be? Not surprisingly, democratic theorists 
disagree among themselves about its specific articulation, and the different approaches 
towards it are a direct reflection of different conceptions of democracy that we support. Any 
attempt to identify a single value or a set of values accepted by all those who espouse 
democracy is ultimately futile: democracy is, to use Ronald Dworkin’s characterization 
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applied to political ideals in general, both an ‘interpretive’ and an ‘integrated’ ideal.35 It is, 
firstly, interpretive in the sense that people not only disagree about the value of democracy 
but also disagree about what democracy really is, and no ‘Archimedean’ standpoint is 
available in order to establish, in a descriptive manner, the meaning of democracy before we 
get on with the debates about its worth. And, secondly, it is an ‘integrated’ (rather than a 
‘detached’) ideal in the sense that the meaning and value of democracy are only revealed 
through their place in a larger constellation of values, which mutually reinforce and confer 
worth upon each other. 
One might think that this characterization of democracy as both interpretive and integrated (in 
the Dworkinian sense) detracts from the argument that there is a ‘foundational’ value behind 
democracy, such as that of equal moral agency. It does not, however; indeed, it only 
strengthens the view that democracy is value-based in a sense that renders the concept of 
‘democracy without values’ largely meaningless. For we may disagree over what specific 
account to give of the values that justify democracy in the first place: some will discern 
irreducibly theological grounds for such values,36 while others will insist that they are based 
upon equal rationality free from any transcendental presuppositions. 37  These different 
articulations of democracy-justifying values will yield somewhat different conceptions of 
democracy itself, and there is nothing puzzling or embarrassing about this. What matters is 
that there must be some values that have to be adopted and defended, and whose general 
contours are by-and-large egalitarian, in order to counter and outweigh the prima facie 
rational arguments for elitist, aristocratic, or technocratic models of collective decision-
making. These by-and-large egalitarian values must be powerful enough to disarm the 
arguments from the rationality of apportioning the power of the vote as a function of one’s 
competences as measured by a person’s intelligence, education, etc. They must be able to 
convince us that when it comes to fundamental decision-making about, for example, which 
major political party should govern for the next four or five years, what should be the nation’s 
choice on joining a major international alliance, or whether abortion should be punished by 
law or not, each adult citizen’s qualification to make an informed choice (or, more precisely, 
the qualifications of each person who cares to go to vote) is as good as that of any others’. 
Indeed, our intuitive acceptance of the one person-one vote system shows, through something 
rather like a reflective equilibrium analysis,38 that we do accept the background values that 
render the democratic system of voting a ‘fixed point’ in our commonly accepted 
constellation of values.39  
B. Pure Procedural Democracy? 
It may be objected that the remarks above apply only to ‘politique politisante’ rather than a 
‘politique politisée’: that even although, at the level of the general design of a democratic 
system, its legitimacy is assured by a strong value-based justification, nevertheless at the 
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level of the actual application of the design in everyday political life, the connection between 
democracy and values cannot be taken for granted. The urge to infuse democracy with values 
– a democracy-plus conception – can therefore be located at the level of the everyday 
workings and implementation of the design, rather than the design itself. It is there (so the 
argument may go) that the danger that democracy will become disconnected from substantive 
moral value is real, and it is there that the warnings (including those quoted above by the 
Pope) against ‘a political community independent of ethical principles’ maintain their force 
and validity. To think otherwise would be a sign of naïve faith in the self-perpetuating force 
of the moral values that underlie the choice of a democratic system in the first place: the hope 
that the values that justify the adoption of democracy would reveal themselves at each ‘use’ 
of the system.  
This would be akin to what John Rawls dubbed ‘perfect procedural justice’: an institutional 
system that guarantees that any outcome of the institutional response to a challenge is always 
and necessarily just, in terms of standards of justice independent of the procedure itself.40 
With regard to democracy, it would express a hope that once we put a democratic system in 
place (justified, as it is, by certain values), each outcome of the democratic game will express 
those very values. However, (the argument might continue), just as in real life we do not have 
the luxury of ‘perfect procedural justice’ at work (other than some hypothetical examples 
invented to illustrate the concept itself, such as – in an example provided by Rawls – a system 
in which the person who divides a cake will be the last to pick up his slice),41 so in real life 
we cannot hope for democratic procedures that will always and necessarily give effect to the 
values that justify the system as a whole. Just as the best that we can hope for in the area of 
distributive justice is to set up systems of ‘imperfect procedural justice’ (which maximize the 
likelihood of achieving procedurally just outcomes), so in the case of the democratic 
legitimacy of political systems we can hope, at best, for institutional designs that will 
maximize, but never guarantee, the achievement of outcomes that are legitimate by virtue of 
their congruence with the values that justified the choice of system in the first place. 
There is a temptation to give a quick answer to the objection described in the preceding 
paragraph, which should, however, be resisted. The temptation is to appeal to the concept of 
‘pure procedural justice’, which is different from the perfect and imperfect concepts in that it 
dispenses altogether with outcome-based criteria of justice: pure procedural justice obtains 
whenever the correct procedure is strictly adhered to (as in sports or gambling, in which we 
do not have any outcome-based criteria to judge whether the result is just). In contrast, perfect 
and imperfect forms of justice use outcome-based criteria, and the only difference between 
imperfect and perfect justice is that the latter guarantees, whereas the former merely 
maximizes, the congruence of the outcome with our standards of justice. The quick response 
that I have in mind would be to suggest that the problems raised by democracy are more akin 
to the problematique of pure procedural justice than to that of (im)perfect procedural justice, 
in that the only democratic game in town is procedural and we should not concern ourselves 
with the ‘fit’ between the outcome of a democratic game with the outcome-based standards of 
democracy, but only with the compliance of political (including legislative) procedures with 
purely procedural rules.     
As I already noted, this temptation should be resisted: the ‘answer’ provided here is decidedly 
too quick. Even in Rawls’ initial introduction of the three-way division between forms of 
procedural justice, serious doubts can be raised about its ‘pure’ manifestation: do we really 
refer to the outcomes of sports competitions or gambling as ‘just’ merely because they 
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comply  with the rules of procedure? To my ear, such a characterization is out of place in 
such situations; the conferral of the status of ‘justice’ in these cases is contrary to the 
semantic intuition many of us have. This would suggest that the language of procedural 
justice is always and necessarily a reflection of the justness of the outcome.42 This impression 
is only strengthened upon consideration of the problems of democratic legitimacy. To say that, 
once a democratic system is in place, any outcome will be, by definition, democratic, because 
we do not have an independent outcome-based notion of democratic legitimacy seems 
contrary to our intuitions. Rather, the opposite is true: we feel that if the democratic majority, 
in accordance with a democratic procedure,  were to (for example) deprive members of an 
ethnic minority of their fundamental rights, then the outcome would be illegitimate as 
contrary to the foundational values of democracy itself. So we do have criteria of a 
democratically legitimate outcome after all; and, if we support democracy it is not because 
we believe that by definition anything that such a system produces is legitimate, but rather 
because we believe that a democracy, more than any other system, maximizes the attainment 
of values that we endorse. It is not by virtue of a definitional identification of legitimacy with 
the scrupulous observance of procedural rules, but rather through our real-life experiences of 
how different systems connect with values that we may endorse democracy: to do so merely 
by definitional fiat would be weak and unconvincing.  
Thus, the easy way out of invoking pure procedural justice is not available to us, meaning that 
the best we can do is to uphold democracy as a device similar to imperfect procedural justice: 
a system that maximizes the achievement of democracy’s foundational values, although it 
falls short of guaranteeing that each and every instance of a democratic procedure will 
perfectly reflect those values. The distinction between ‘politique politisante’ and ‘politique 
politisée’ therefore stands, and the fear that a political community will render itself 
‘independent of ethical principles’ cannot be easily dispelled, it appears, by a general appeal 
to the ethical principles foundational of democracy itself.  
So we need to think a little harder about what the opposite of a democracy-plus would look 
like, and what dangers may accompany a ‘political community independent of ethical 
principles’. There are two main ways in which a disconnection of democracy from moral 
values can possibly be imagined to occur, and reflection upon these two negative scenarios 
may bring us closer to a positive idea of what democracy-plus might be. The first way in 
which such a disconnection could take place may be understood at the level of the 
motivations of political actors in a democracy (both voters and their representatives in the 
parliamentary assemblies): if their decisions are motivated not by value-based considerations, 
but by some other grounds deemed antithetical to an infusion of democracy with values. Let 
us call this aspect ‘motivational’. The second manner in which such a disconnection may be 
imagined is when political decisions acquire validity solely by virtue of being adopted in a 
procedurally proper way, regardless of the degree of congruency between these decisions and 
the foundational values of a democracy. This, as we have seen, would be a sign of adopting a 
‘pure procedural justice’–like approach to democracy, and seems unsatisfactory, as it ignores 
the fact that we construct democratic legitimacy in a way more akin to imperfect procedural 
justice. The gap between perfect and imperfect justice raises the spectre of decisions that are 
procedurally correct and based on a system that, by and large, maximizes the attainment of 
democracy’s foundational values, but that may, in particular instances, be inconsistent with 
those values. Let us call this dimension ‘constitutional’ (for reasons that will become obvious 
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later). These two examples of apparent disconnection of democracy from values should be 
kept apart, because they generate different problems for the issue of democratic legitimacy in 
the face of society’s value pluralism.  
C. Values at the motivational level  
The first level at which we may (theoretically) perceive and deplore ‘value-free democracy’ is 
that of the motivations of voters and their representatives. Here a short aside is in order: for 
the purposes of democratic theory as discussed here, the distinction between individual 
citizens and political actors, such as the members of legislative bodies, is irrelevant: we must 
assume a full continuity between the motivations, intentions, preferences, etc., of the 
individual voters and their representatives in parliament (a point to which I will refer below 
as the ‘continuity thesis’). Of course, we know that this assumption is naïve and not very 
realistic, but as a matter of a normative democratic theory it does not make any difference 
whether we consider the motivations of the institutional actors or of individual citizens. Or, to 
put it differently, a citizen qua voter is also a political institution, and only as such is 
considered relevant for the purposes of democratic theory.43 
At this motivational level, the separation of democracy from values can be discerned in the 
reliance of voters and their representatives upon their interests rather than values and ideals. 
Democracy is eroded of values, it can be said, when public decisions are motivated by the 
calculus of interests rather than of ideals, and when the ‘input’ to political decision-making 
consists of our own perceptions of our interests rather than ideals about the public good. To 
take an example, if my motivation in voting for a particular taxation scheme (or voting for a 
party on the basis of its taxation program) is guided only by the question: ‘Which of the 
alternative tax schemes will be the best for me?’, then this results in a deplorably value-free 
democratic process; the right question should have been: ‘Which of the alternative tax 
schemes best corresponds to a defensible idea of justice in taxation?’  
This particular example shows, incidentally, that a ‘motivational’ understanding of the 
democracy-plus claim is immune to the possible charge that it adopts an illiberal stance in the 
controversy between perfectionism and anti-perfectionism in the debate over the proper limits 
of state action in enforcing moral values. ‘Democracy-plus’, in this version, may be but need 
not be illiberally perfectionistic. If perfectionism is understood in a broad, and not necessarily 
illiberal, way, as the proposition that the role of the state includes the strong commitment to 
personal autonomy (which requires a high degree of respect for individual choices of ways of 
life and which is well captured by the ‘harm principle’),44 then the democracy-plus’ call for 
acting on values rather than on interests is perfectionistic but in a non-objectionable manner – 
from a liberal standpoint at least. It may simply mean nothing more than that a polity should 
aim at the implementation of some notions of the social good, and that the accommodation of 
particular interests should be informed by some public ideals of justice. If, however, 
perfectionism is taken to mean that the state should enforce some ideals of private morality 
that express some controversial notions of individual virtue (that the state should identify and 
coercively promote superior ideals of human excellence),45 there is nothing in the call to act 
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on values rather than on interests (whatever it may mean, as will be discussed shortly) that 
creates a necessary bias in this direction within democracy-plus. The demand, for example, 
that in the debate on redistribution through taxation we should be guided by our ideals of 
public good rather than by our particular interests is evidently not illiberally perfectionistic: it 
takes no stand in the dispute about the role of the law in shaping private morality (the notion 
of ‘the good’, as contrasted to ‘the right’, in Rawls’s parlance) of the citizens.    
But the continuity thesis, suggested in the first paragraph of the present section, can be 
challenged in a way that resonates with the debates concerning ‘perfectionism’, that is, by 
appeal to the notion of neutrality of legislation towards competing moral conceptions. It can 
be claimed that, even if we adopt the ideal of ‘moral neutrality’ of the state, and attempt to 
discern the indicia of this neutrality in the motivations of the legislators, it cannot go all the 
way down;  we must not expect individual voters to be neutral on issues of private morality.46 
It is one thing, it may be argued, for the state to attempt to be as neutral as possible on the 
controversial issues of private morality; it is quite another to expect citizens to reflect such 
neutrality in their decisions and conduct. While the former ideal may be a useful way of 
articulating the liberal political ideal, the latter demand (addressed to individuals) can be seen 
as absurd.47  This ‘absurdity’, however,  can only arise if we confuse the perspective of 
individual as a private person and an individual as a citizen-voter. Being neutral in our private 
capacity on moral issues is just a fancy and somewhat confused manner of saying that we are 
uncertain, or agnostic, about some controversial moral matters. But being neutral when we act 
in our public capacity as voters has no air of absurdity of confusion: it simply means that we 
act on a distinction between our notions of private morality and our notions of the public 
good.  Naturally, the distinction itself is controversial and open to challenge, but if we accept 
that the distinction can be made, or at least attempted, then it can be drawn equally well in the 
mind of an individual voter as in the minds of the legislators, and in consequence relied upon 
by the collective legislator in its law-making. Therefore, the continuity thesis seems immune 
to this criticism.  
The distinction between these two types of motivations, interests and values, corresponds to a 
classical debate between adherents of a ‘pluralistic’ conception of democracy and those 
preferring a Rousseauian one. The former – taking their inspiration from Jeremy Bentham – 
find it both empirically plausible and normatively acceptable that people vote on the basis of 
their interests, and the aggregate public decision that tries to accommodate those various and 
divergent preferences is the only matrix of a ‘public good’ that we can have. The latter, 
following Jean Jacques Rousseau, reject interests-based decisions as inappropriate in a 
democracy; whoever (whether a voter or a representatives) tries to gauge his or her interests 
as the basis for their decisions, answers the wrong question – the one that should not be asked 
in the public forum. The only relevant question to ask is: ‘which of the alternative proposals 
is most congruent with my view about the public good?’ (which best tracks the idea of 
general will, in Rousseau’s parlance); even though we know, contra Rousseau, that we will 
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encounter fundamental disagreements among members of the society in answering this type 
of question, it will be a different disagreement from that generated by conflicts of interests. 
A call for ‘democracy-plus’, under this interpretation, amounts therefore to a rejection of a 
Benthamite vision and endorsement of a Rousseauian democracy in which people vote on the 
basis of ideals rather than interests.48  Why would such a choice provide us with a step 
towards morally legitimate democracy, in the sense of its infusion with moral values? The 
best answer I can think of is by linking the interests/values distinction to the liberal principle 
of legitimacy: the principle that the use of coercive powers against a person can be legitimate 
only if that person can accept the reasons that stand behind the law or policy that authorizes 
this coercive use. There is an important strand in liberal thinking that links legitimacy with 
the consent of the governed.49 Not the actual consent, of course, because such an requirement 
would undercut the whole search for the principles of political legitimacy; we would end up 
with the anarchistic idea that each individual is bound only by those laws to which he has 
agreed. But consent, hypothetical at least, is needed in order to confer some degree of 
legitimacy upon the laws, which, after all, can never enjoy the unanimous support of all the 
citizens. In a weak but plausible version, the liberal principle of legitimacy postulates that 
only laws that are based upon arguments and reasons to which no members of the society 
have a rational reason to object can boast political legitimacy, and as such be applied 
coercively even to those who actually disagree with them. A contemporary locus classicus of 
the liberal principle of legitimacy is of course Rawls’s Political Liberalism: ‘Our exercise of 
political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with the constitution 
the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in 
the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason’.50 Rawls further 
elaborates upon this conception in his discussion of the concept of ‘public reason’, that is, 
publicly recognizable standards of right and wrong. He also suggests that, as a test, we might 
inquire as to whether a particular argument for a new law belongs to the category of ‘public 
reason’ by considering whether it could be used in a written opinion of a supreme court.51 
The implication is clear: some arguments, even if actually present in the minds of legislators 
or policy-makers, are not qualified to figure in the public defence of a law: the law must be 
defensible in terms that belong to a ‘forum of principle’ rather than an arena of political 
bargains and plays of naked interest.   
This last point suggests that the liberal principle of legitimacy operates, more often than not, 
in a negative (or weak) fashion, namely, to discard illegitimate laws:52 a law cannot claim any 
legitimacy towards me if it is based upon arguments and reasons that I have no reason to 
accept. For instance, if the best (or the most plausible) justification that can be given for a law 
is in terms of a religious sectarian creed, and I happen not to espouse that creed, then I have 
no rational reason to recognize the law as legitimate. Or if the law is based upon an argument 
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that casts me out from the political community (for example, an argument that considers my 
racial group as inherently inferior to other groups), then there is no moral reason why I should 
recognize this law as legitimate: I cannot identify with the reasons that triggered the adoption 
of this law in the first place. The denial of legitimacy to such a law is based on the view that 
there must be some connection between the law and myself qua subject of the law – a 
connection that establishes some rational reasons to identify the good for myself in the law. 
The connection must be between the substance of the law and the preferences, desires, 
convictions or interests of each individual subjected to it. If, even under rational examination, 
no such connection can be detected, then I have no reasons to accept the law as legitimate. If, 
however, I disagree with the wisdom of a given law, but would agree if I examined it 
rationally that it is based upon arguments that I can recognize as valid, then a necessary 
condition for its legitimacy has been met. This point has been well expressed by Jeremy 
Waldron: ‘If there is some individual to whom a justification cannot be given, then so far as 
he is concerned the social order had better be replaced by other arrangements, for the status 
quo has made out no claim to his allegiance’.53 
As it stands, the formula is fraught with ambiguity: from the fact that a justification can be 
given, it does not follow that it will be accepted as framed in terms of public reason, just as, 
to return to Rawls’s formula, it does not follow from the diagnosis that citizens ‘may be 
expected to endorse’ the constitution that they actually endorse it. The actual acceptance 
requirement would turn the hypothetical consent test into a real consent (a clearly 
unreasonable requirement), but, on the other hand, the hypothetical acceptance standard 
makes the test both manipulable and difficult to apply. There is a space between what the 
citizens can be reasonably expected to accept and what they actually accept, and the liberal 
principle of legitimacy reflects the tension between these two poles: an insufficient pole of 
hypothetical, rational consent and an unrealistic pole of an actual (even if only tacit) consent. 
This tension, however, is not a contradiction – and does not render the liberal principle of 
legitimacy chimerical – for two reasons. Firstly, and perhaps trivially, the subject matter of 
the consent is not the wisdom or justness of the law, but only a certification that the reasons 
that may be rationally supplied for its defence belong to ‘public reason’: that is, that they are 
not ‘sectarian’ but belong to the category of reasons that may properly be cited in defence of 
a law. Arguably, it is easier to elicit consent that the reasons provided for adopting a law fall 
into this category than to seek universal agreement with the specific justification of a 
particular law: the former is a more lenient test than the latter. Secondly, and more 
importantly, it does not particularly matter that the criterion of acceptance is discerned in a 
hypothetical rather than a real consent, because what we are concerned with is the legitimacy 
of the law rather than the citizens’ duty to obey, and for this reason we may well identify the 
locus of legitimacy in the eyes of a critical observer rather than in the eyes of the citizens 
themselves. This distinction, between a critical-observer perspective and that of an actual 
citizen corresponds to a distinction drawn by Simmons between generic and transactional 
evaluations in political philosophy: the former correspond to the general moral virtues of 
political arrangements, the latter, to the specific, actual interactions between individual 
persons and their polities.54 Here we can content ourselves with the former because our aim is 
to ground the system’s legitimacy (understood as its justification) rather than the obligation of 
citizens to comply with its directives. Hypothetical consent becomes, then, merely an 
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‘expository device’ of a critical observer’s reasoning (just as in Rawls, the original position is 
an expository device of our individual reasoning about justice)55, leading to the conclusion 
that the law indeed is legitimate (that, in Raz’s language, it properly incorporates in its 
directives the reasons which apply to its subjects).  
This is perhaps most clearly viewed in the case of Dworkin’s conception of legitimacy, based 
as it is upon ‘the model of principle’: our institutions are legitimate if they operate within a 
community that genuinely takes ‘integrity’ as central to politics, and which therefore 
‘expresses a concern by each for all that is sufficiently special, personal, pervasive, and 
egalitarian to ground communal obligations’.56 At first blush, there is very little room in this 
version of the liberal principle of legitimacy for any consent by citizens, hypothetical or 
otherwise, and the certification of the institutions as legitimate (and of the community as 
principle- or integrity-based) results from a judgment as to how well they fare under the 
standards of the group that generated the proper associative obligations. In these cases, ‘the 
members of a group must by and large hold certain attitudes about the responsibilities they 
owe one another’,57 including that they ‘must suppose that the group’s practices show not 
only concern but an equal concern for all members’.58 This judgment (that the group treats all 
with an equal concern) need not necessarily be actually shared by those who are on the 
receiving end of coercive action, but, on the other hand, if even the other members of the 
group cannot reasonably attest to the institutions’ attitude of treating all with an equal concern 
then those institutions lack a threshold condition of legitimacy.   
Returning to the values/interests distinction from which we began, it can be now seen that this 
distinction is a very imperfect and crude proxy for the distinction between those justifications 
of laws that are properly part of public reason, and hence that can be accepted as valid by all 
those to whom they apply (even if, in practice, some will not agree with the substance of the 
laws), and, on the other hand, those justifications that cannot be given to citizens because they 
violate the liberal test of legitimacy. The first distinction (values versus interests) is not well 
correlated with the second (proper justifications of law in terms of public reasons versus 
justifications that not everyone can be expected to accept), and it is the latter distinction that 
is crucial to the issue of legitimacy, the main question that has occupied us here. The first 
distinction is secondary, and, to the degree that it does not track the latter distinction, it is of 
no special relevance for us.  
Why would someone have thought that the interests/values distinction was important for the 
legitimacy of law and policy under something like a liberal principle of legitimacy? With 
reference to this principle, the reason might be this: it could be claimed that if the best 
justification for a particular law is that it meets the interests of a group X, then if I am not a 
member of a group X, I have no reason to accept this law. But it is enough to articulate this 
argument in this way to see how implausible it is. For one thing, not every interest-based 
argument must be ‘sectarian’ in this way: there may be laws that implement the interests of 
everyone or nearly everyone, by providing solutions to coordination problems. They will still 
be justified in terms of interests, but nevertheless they may figure as ‘public reason’ in that 
they are justifiable to (almost) everyone. Second, even if a law’s main justification is that it 
implements the interests of group X, as a non-X member I may still recognize the importance 
of meeting this group’s interests, on the basis of my notions of fairness, compensation, etc. It 
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may be argued, of course, that then the best justification for this law is in terms of justice 
rather than in terms of X’s interests, but this only serves to illustrate how uncertain and 
unreliable the very distinction between interests and values is in the first place.   
This is confirmed by common sense. When a particular person votes, for example, for a 
particular tax scheme which in fact will make her richer, does she vote on the basis of her 
interests, or of her sense of justice (she genuinely believes that she deserves it), or on the 
basis of her view about the public good (she believes that it is the most efficient scheme, 
which will, incidentally, also make her richer)? It is difficult to separate these different 
justifications from each other, and the most sensible observation would be that, usually, we 
make our public decisions on the basis of a complex mix of such, and other, justifications.59 
Matters become even more complicated if the example does not refer to a law that has clear 
material benefits and costs to the voters (such as a tax scheme), but rather concerns complex 
moral judgments about the rightness or otherwise of a particular practice, and the law’s 
proper reaction to it. What would it take to vote on the basis of one’s ‘interests’ on issues 
such as abortion, euthanasia or capital punishment? A ‘Benthamite’ picture would probably 
be that a vote based on interests would mean that someone who feels that she is likely to 
terminate her pregnancy, or terminate her life, or be punished for murder, will vote, 
respectively, for a liberal regime of abortion and euthanasia, and against the death penalty. 
But such a preposterous supposition would be an obvious travesty, ignoring what we know 
about why people support or oppose such laws. The subject-matter of these laws simply does 
not lend itself to an interest-based motivation although, arguably, we could think of 
arguments in favour of them that would not pass the public-reason test. In these areas, calls 
for value-based motivations (and, more broadly, for a value-enhanced democracy) simply 
sound redundant.  
We may generalize this point. A society does not have normativity-free zones: it is, so to 
speak, normatively saturated. Some subject-matters – most subject-matters belonging to the 
public area – yield individual choices based on values. In this sense, a call for a value-based 
democracy (understood in the first, motivational, sense discussed here) is empty: it is not the 
case that democracy should not be value-free but rather that it cannot be so. That the 
motivations of citizens and their representatives in taking public decisions will not be free of 
values is not a real problem: what is, however, is that they will differ\, often fundamentally, 
as to the choice of values. This is therefore a ‘problem’ of moral pluralism and not of value-
free democracy. The warnings of the adherents of democracy-plus, including of John Paul II, 
against ‘a political community … independent of ethical principles’ are therefore either very 
weak, or they are a proxy for a warning against a community ‘independent of the right ethical 
principles’. The very weak interpretation amounts to a warning against moral indifference or 
apathy: against citizens and their representatives ignoring all moral values when voting on 
public issues. But such a fear is unfounded, as we have seen, and the warning is for this 
reason practically meaningless. If, however, the warning is understood in the latter sense, 
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then it is incompatible with the liberal-democratic order that attempts to create legitimate law 
for people who differ greatly over the moral values they believe to be right. The strong 
interpretation amounts to a plea for a polity that enforces morality in the strongly 
‘perfectionist’ manner identified earlier in the article: it is a political community that 
coercively imposes ideals of individual good and virtue upon those who do not necessarily 
share them.  
D. Values at the constitutional level 
The second level at which the legitimacy of democratic laws might be seen to be contingent 
upon their incorporation of the right values is of a different nature. It concerns not the 
motivations of the decision-makers (voters and legislators alike), but the value-laden limits 
upon the substance of democratically adopted decisions: it therefore concerns the ‘output’ 
rather than the ‘input’, so to speak. The idea here is that democratic decisions, in order to be 
legitimate, must comply with certain substance-related requirements, or that they cannot 
transcend certain substance-related constraints. I will call this dimension ‘constitutional’ for 
the obvious reason that the identification of the substantive limits that a legislator is not 
permitted to overstep is widely seen to be one of the main functions of constitutions, and in 
particular of constitutional charters of rights.  
I will be brief in discussing this aspect of democratic legitimacy – not because it is 
unimportant but because it has been dealt with so expansively in the literature in 
constitutional theory. For my present purposes, it is important only to indicate that this second 
dimension of the ‘democracy-plus’ raises different problems in the face of moral pluralism 
than the first, ‘motivational’ dimension. The issue here is not so much that a fear of moral 
indifference or apathy is generally unfounded (as was the case with the motivational 
dimension), but rather that, in the process of the articulation of the meaning of vague 
constitutional pronouncements, actual moral disagreement over moral values is merely 
replicated rather than deflated. We may well accept, as a starting point, that the legitimate 
exercise of authority in a democratic state requires us to assume that there are some limits to 
what the authorities can decide. Indeed, the acceptance of the principle of respect for human 
rights itself necessarily also means that there are substantive limits to what authorities can do 
to individuals. (There may also be other implications of the human rights principle: for 
example, that there are some opportunities that must be provided to citizens, and the language 
of opportunity does not translate easily into the language of limits, except trivially. However, 
human rights include also, amongst other things but necessarily, the idea of limits). The 
‘problem’ is that, faced with moral disagreement in society, even if the constitution is 
accepted consensually (which is a presupposition adopted only for the sake of argument), the 
actual articulation of the general constitutional rights translates the general moral 
disagreement into a disagreement as to whether a particular authoritative directive transcends 
the limits imposed by the constitution.  
This is not the weak observation that, at the margins, people will disagree about the specific 
‘penumbra’ of a particular vague concept implicated in various constitutional rights. Rather, it 
is that the disagreement will often be fundamental and central to the meaning of a right-as-
limit. For example, whether freedom of speech mandates or prohibits limits on paid political 
advertisements, or whether the right against discrimination prohibits, permits or mandates 
affirmative action in university admissions, or whether the right to life requires or prohibits 
assistance in terminating the life of a terminally ill patient on demand – these and a myriad 
other controversies can easily be understood in terms of constitutional rights, but our 
disagreements in the interpretation of these constitutional rights will simply replicate the prior 
disagreement over the moral issues that these rights were supposed to resolve. We will not 
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only disagree over whether a proposed law transcends a substantive limit imposed by a 
constitutional right, but, even more fundamentally, over what interpretation of a right 
constitutes a limit on the exercise of state authority in the first place. Is a ban on euthanasia a 
limit on what can be done to a person (with the subsequent discussion about where exactly 
this limit lies), or is a legal opportunity of terminating one’s life with the help of a doctor a 
limit on what can be prohibited and enforced against a person? The answers, of course, will 
be a direct reflection of prior and more fundamental moral disagreement. Thus, while we may 
well all agree that there should be some limits to what the state can do to individuals, once we 
start debating what constitutes a limit, not to mention where the limits should properly lie, the 
constitutional pronouncements of rights will turn out to be singularly unhelpful.60  
This is not to say that rights provisions are irrelevant, or without significance. On the contrary, 
we know that they play a very significant role politically in providing, in various legal 
systems, judicial or non-judicial bodies with the grounds for decisions that may invalidate, or 
re-interpret, the laws adopted by legislatures. There is, however, no reason to adopt a position 
of institutional fetishism, and to assume that a constitutionally identified institution that has 
the power to displace the choices of other bodies with its own is, eo ipso, ‘right’ in the 
articulation of the meaning of a controversial constitutional provision. Indeed, a disagreement 
between two bodies, for example between a parliament and a constitutional (or a supreme) 
court (or to be more precise, between the majorities of these collective bodies), will more 
often than not merely reflect a moral disagreement existing in the society as a whole about 
what, in terms of a vague constitutional provision, constitutes a limit on state action, and 
where that limit should properly lie. The power of such an extra-parliamentary body to 
pronounce on the decisions of the parliament simply adds one step to the constitutionally 
prescribed procedure that has to be followed in order for the decision to be final and 
legitimate; however, it remains a procedure-based legitimacy, not a values-based one. The 
law as corrected in a process of judicial review is not necessarily more within the limits 
defined by constitutional rights than a law without such a correction, but the review does 
make a difference in terms of what counts as a legitimate procedure for the issuing of legal 
directives. As a judge of the US Supreme Court once famously said: ‘We are not final 
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final’.61 The conferral on 
a particular institution of the power to strike down laws on the basis of their (alleged) 
inconsistency with constitutional rights is a matter of institutional fiat, which adds (rightly or 
wrongly – this is beyond the scope of this paper) one step to the correct procedure to be 
followed. The decisions that emerge from such a procedure acquire democratic legitimacy, 
just as those that issue from a procedure free where no such possibility of review exists, 
acquire democratic legitimacy. There may be good substantive, political arguments related to 
the institutional competence of various organs for creating or removing such a power – but 
the argument about enhancing legitimacy by injecting the right values into the decision is not 
one of them. ‘Democracy-plus’ cannot build upon the notion of substantive, value-based 
constitutional limits on democratic procedures. 
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 More on this, in my ‘Judicial Review and the Protection of Constitutional Rights’, (2002) 22 OJLS 275 at 
294-296. 
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 Brown v Allen, 344 US 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson J, concurring). It should be noted, however, that Justice 
Jackson made this remark not in the context of the Supreme Court striking down a congressional act, but in the 
context of reversing a state court’s decision. 
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3. Conclusions 
The upshot of the second part of the paper may seem disappointing and perhaps upsetting. It 
seems to go against the current popular disenchantment with purely ‘procedural’ democracy, 
which, as the experience of the twentieth century shows, is not a panacea for all social ills, 
and often lacks sufficient self-defense mechanisms against those who would use democratic 
procedures to pursue inhuman, oppressive and discriminatory goals – and demolish 
democratic institutions in the process. But such a reading of my conclusions would be 
unwarranted: I do not call for indifference as to ‘values’ and for exclusive concern with the 
proper ‘procedures’. If anything, my conclusion is the opposite: that our values are normally 
and routinely engaged with democratic procedures, and any skepticism about purely 
procedural democracy can be properly read as a disappointment that a particular democratic 
system gives effect to some values other than our own. This sense of disappointment is hard 
to reconcile with the acceptance of moral pluralism and disagreement as a pervasive, 
persistent and significant feature of contemporary societies.  
Disappointment of this sort, in particular, should not lead one to deny legitimacy to laws that 
have been adopted in accordance with proper democratic procedures. This, however, is not a 
recipe for blind obedience to democratically adopted laws; as I argued in the first part of this 
paper, each individual is not necessarily obliged to comply with every legitimate law. The 
disconnection of legitimacy from the duty to obey – a disconnection advanced for reasons 
discussed earlier – has the consequence of deflating the apparent drama of what to do about 
laws adopted in a procedurally correct manner in a democracy and yet which strike us as 
morally wrong. A democratic and liberal legal system can and should provide room for 
disobedience to legitimate law, but this question is beyond the scope of this paper: what is 
important is that a finding that a given law is legitimate does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that it must be always complied with by those who disagree with it. However, we 
need a language in which to express the combination of recognition of legitimacy and refusal 
to obey on moral grounds; and if we were to incorporate the ‘right’ values into our test for the 
legitimacy of law, then this possibility would no longer exist.  
 
 
 
